Archive for the 'Foreclosure News' Category
Sacramento Real Estate: Loan Mods Would Stop Many Sacramento Foreclosures
March 1st, 2010 Categories: Foreclosure News
Loan Mods Would Stop Many Foreclosures
The loan mod question: What’s wrong with this picture? Why aren’t they working?
I talk to families all the time who are struggling making payments on a home here in our Sacramento area that may be 30, 40, maybe even 50% or more upside-down… inevitably, they ask “instead of making us foreclose or do a short sale; why wont the the bank just ‘re-sell’ it to us and let us stay here?”
That would come in the form of a loan modification or a short refinance…
Most of the time, the homeowners have either already tried to do a loan modification and could not qualify, or actually have qualified, gone through the 90 day HAMP trial program and received a final long term modification offer from the servicer that just didn’t make sense.
One lady last week, had a loan dification where the payment INCREASED $180.00 per month!
So what is really going on here? Why the heck wouldn’t the bank, servicer, investor and everyone involved just get with the program and help these people?
Good question.
Makes absolute sense.
I have wondered that for a couple of years now myself, and thought I had a good answer for that; I was under the impression it had something to do with the fact that the investor or note holder or owner of the mortgage would rather have a big influx of cash, and have the opportunity to go re-invest somewhere else. (*yeah, but where?)
For instance, instead of agreeing to write off $100,000 and also agree to a new loan from the existing home owner for a subsequently lower monthly payment, the note owner would rather get a big influx of cash by doing a short sale or foreclosure and go invest what’s left of his money somewhere else. I mean; why else would they be disallowing and not providing more loan modifications for good, creditworthy and very qualified homeowners. Most of these people have just had a reduction in income; by furlough days, reduction in overtime etc. and are just struggling… just having a hard time making a payment that is two or three times the amount of rent they would be paying to rent the same house.
These people are still good credit risks, still making payments, just absolutely struggling and looking for help; with today’s standards though, they need to get behind on payments usually in order to do a loan mod or be approved for a short sale…
In my daily reading I came across this great article by Ocwen’s Paul A. Koches. Mr. Koches is Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Ocwen since May 2008. Koches oversees the legal affairs of the company as well as its government, community, and media relations.
In the article, Mr.Koches talks about The National Consumer Law Center and their October report, “Why Servicers Foreclose When They Should Modify and Other Puzzles of Servicer Behavior: Servicer Compensation and Its ConsequencesI have included the entire text here but also a link to DSNews.
No Matter How Ocwen Looks at It, Loan Modifications Are Better Business for Servicers Than Foreclosures
The National Consumer Law Center (NCLC), Inc., is an effective, concerned organization that works to advance justice and fair treatment for consumers, especially those who are economically disadvantaged.
So it is natural—and, of course, very helpful—that NCLC has been researching the mortgage crisis and speaking out on behalf of homeowners. Recently, NCLC explored important and troubling questions. If mortgage modifications—now advocated and incentivized by the Obama administration—are the key solution to the crisis, why have relatively few occurred, and at a slow pace, while foreclosures continue at an unprecedented, damaging clip?
NCLC’s October report, “Why Servicers Foreclose When They Should Modify and Other Puzzles of Servicer Behavior: Servicer Compensation and Its Consequences,” underscores some important points:
- The pace of loan modifications by the servicing industry is generally too slow;
- The national foreclosure rate is still way too high; and
- Any successful attempts to redress the foreclosure crisis will, of necessity, involve loan modifications.
INCORRECT TO THE CORE
In exploring the conundrum of high foreclosure rates and relatively sluggish modification rates, the NCLC report takes loan servicers to task. That’s certainly a reasonable approach as servicers are the entities responsible for modifications. The NCLC analysis of servicers, however, is based on some incorrect core assumptions. It says servicersmake more money with foreclosures, so therefore, they have no real financial incentive to pursue sustainable, lasting modifications.
That simply isn’t true. Servicers rarely, if ever, make money when there’s a foreclosure. They’re expensive, time consuming, and draining. REO, in this real estate market, just isn’t a good business. On the other hand, modifications are good business—and make financial sense for servicers—when they’re done prudently and carefully. The fact is, in most cases, a modified loan, even one in which the principal has been adjusted, generates more income for a servicer than a foreclosure.
OPERATIONS NOT UP TO SPEED
Perhaps the real reason for the generally slow start to modifications is more operational than financial. Servicers, at this time, simply do not have sufficient know-how, capacity, and experience to communicate withtheir customers to design and effect sustainable modifications on scale with the problem—and they’re not turning to the outside resources that do have the platform and capacity to help.
It’s worth noting that at Ocwen modifications are a key part of the business and operational strategy, and the company has led the industry in the rate of permanent modifications under the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). Ocwenis in this position because it has traditionally worked almost exclusively with high-risk—i.e., subprime—loans and has invested $150 million in R&D for scalable loss mitigation technology and analytics to accommodate significant numbers of modifications. Major players are recognizing Ocwen’s capabilities and are increasingly turning to it to reduce delinquencies and losses and for modification assistance. Recently, large financial institutions have sent Ocwen approximately $15 billion in their mortgages for special servicing and rehabilitation.
Ocwen believes that modifications are good for investors, good business for its company, good for distressed homeowners, good for communities, and good for the housing market overall. Doing good is, more often than not, good business.
FORECLOSURES NOT WALLET-FRIENDLY
The first misguided assumption on NCLC’s part is that servicers usually make money on foreclosures. The reality is that servicers make money when delinquent loans become reperforming. Servicers collect the most servicing fees and incur the lowest costs when this is the case. Foreclosures, in contrast, are costly—and it is simply not true that the servicer always recovers its expenses in foreclosures. Foreclosure is not only a tragedy for a homeowner, but given the all-time-high loss severity rates in the current market, it’s a major loss as well for loan investors (i.e., the owners of the loans). Servicers doing their jobs properly will and should seek alternatives such as modifications to mitigate losses for their clients.
The NCLC grossly underestimates the impact of the loss of monthly servicing fees when there’s a foreclosure. Those fees, which resume when there’s a sustainable modification, are really the lifeblood of a servicing business. Losing them, in an environment where there are no new mortgage securitizations on which to bid for servicing rights, is damaging.
Similarly, NCLC trivializes the servicer incentive and success fees provided for permanent modifications pursuant to the government’s HAMP program. The NCLC report asserts these fees aren’t enough to induce servicers to modify, but the reality is these additional incentives are meaningful and revenue-generating.
Finally, NCLC advances the incorrect perception that servicers do well by shunning modifications because they make a lot of money from late fees. That just isn’t true. The reality is that late fees, which are rarely collected in a foreclosure-bound situation, don’t come close to covering the cost of financing advances that servicers must make to investors in case of delinquent loans.
A WINNING HAND
Now for the real story: The bottom line at many servicing shops, including Ocwen, is that the overriding financial incentive comes from adhering to contractual obligations to service the loans, and resolve delinquencies, in the best interest of the investors. So, when a servicer’s metrics indicate a higher investor net present value for a modification than a foreclosure—which is often the case in this environment—the servicer is required to modify the loan.
In short, the financial cards are not stacked against modifications arranged by servicers.
So where is the disconnect? Why are modifications happening so slowly in the industry?
PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS
The root cause is not insufficient servicer incentives; it is instead the pre-existing shortage of industry infrastructure and capacity combined with the time lag needed to effectively expand the same. The real call to action should be for the industry to redouble its effort to ramp up in terms of technology, know-how, and analytics—or at a minimum to find the right modification partners who can help support the effort.
Anticipating an uptick in delinquencies, Ocwen beefed up its loss mitigation staff by 50 percent in 2007. No one, however, could have predicted the tsunami wave of defaults that was about to hit.
At the same time, many large banks had diversified their traditional prime loan origination business by expanding into subprime lending and servicing, often through acquisitions. But successfully integrating a subprimemortgage operation into a prime culture is difficult—they are entirely different worlds. Prime delinquency and foreclosure rates have always been a small fraction of subprime’s; servicing the latter effectively requires many more “high-touch” processes and procedures. It’s not surprising, then, that the big banks were overwhelmed with the unprecedented spikes in subprime delinquencies brought on by the mortgage crisis and continue to struggle to prevent foreclosures even now.
SUSTAINABILITY AND SCALABILITY ARE KEY
Even with the advantage of decades of subprime servicing experience and specialized technology, Ocwen was scrambling at the outset of the mortgage crisis to get defaults in its portfolio under control. Ocwen increased staff by another 30 percent in early 2008. More important, Ocwen decided its basic loss mitigation approach needed to be elevated to the next level—and fast. The forbearance plans and the other techniques that enabled the company to lead the industry in containing losses by avoiding foreclosures would no longer be enough. Nonperforming loans now needed to be fundamentally re-underwritten if there would be any hope of arresting delinquencies.
Ocwenknew full well, however, that the success of any loan modification program would be measured on two essential metrics. It would need to be both sustainable in providing reduced monthly payments that homeowners can truly afford and to which they will commit long term, as well as sufficiently scalable to meet the high number of homeowners in distress. Of course, as a third-party servicer, Ocwen also needed to ensure that its modifications were NPV positive for the owner trusts.
So from the outset of the pre-HAMP modification program, and now under HAMP, Ocwen has been working hard to make modifications stick. Ocwen’s technology utilizes advanced optimization models t0 evaluate the best resolution alternatives. Ocwenalso provides one-on-one financial counseling to the homeowner, aided by interactive scripting engines incorporating behavioral science research for more effective communication with distressed borrowers and more lasting resolutions.
PICKING THE RIGHT PEOPLE PAYS OFF
Ocwen’s behavioral science department has also confirmed—through research, testing, and six sigma analytics—the optimal personality traits and cognitive ability to guide the successful hiring and training of its customer care staff. With these tools, Ocwen can bring on high-performing home retention consultants in 90 days or less. Psychology has thus become an integral part of an overall loss mitigation technology platform that is robust, scaleable, and enables Ocwen not only to cure and control delinquencies in its own portfolio, but also to ramp up quickly to deploy additional capacity for third parties.
The effort and investment are paying off. Ocwen modifications’ re-default rate of 25 percent is far lower than the industry average of 50 percent, as reported by the OCC/OTS. According to a mid-2009 Bank of America Mortgage Credit Research Report, Ocwen has the highest industry average of modifying fixed-rate and adjustable-rate subprime mortgages more than 90 days’ delinquent into current, performing loans.
The Ocwen approach has been especially effective within the Treasury Department program. As noted by Professor Alan White, oft-quoted expert on foreclosure prevention and the HAMP program, “Ocwen . . . has converted 89 percent of borrowers who were on temporary modifications in August to permanent mods by November,” while the conversion rate for large banks for the same period ranged from 11 percent to fewer than 1 percent. Ocwen’s pull through of permanent modifications continues to outpace industry by a wide margin according to Treasury’s most recent monthly HAMP report card.
TIGHTENING COMMUNITY TIES
In addition to raising the bar on analytics, capacity, and technology, there are other ways to add scale and sustainability in the servicer-based loan modification process. One is for servicersto work closely withcommunity groups. They can help reach out to distressed homeowners and help them stabilize their finances and communicate with servicers in candid, productive ways. Community and grassroots groups are also good brainstorm partners and allies for servicers when it’s time to call for government action.
Ocwen recently convened more than 30 representatives of grassroots and national housing advocacy organizations for a roundtable discussion to share new ideas and insights related to preventing foreclosures and helping homeowners. The Ocwen and community group representatives agreed upon a number of imperatives that could streamline and accelerate the loan modification drive. The imperatives include:
- Working closely with Treasury to arrive at more flexible guidelines, so more distressed homeowners qualify for mortgage modifications under HAMP;
- Developing a national HAMP awareness and information campaign to increase homeowner outreach;
- Focusing more intensely on homeowners who are unemployed or under-employed and thus need state or federal assistance to qualify for mortgage modifications; and
- Encouraging greater collaboration between servicers and grassroots groups in providing real-time solutions for homeowners, including being more proactive about helping borrowers early on, before they face the prospect of foreclosure.
The National Consumer Law Center underscored an important issue by looking into why foreclosures continue at too rapid a rate and why the loan modification movement seems slow in taking hold. Contrary to its thesis, however, financial incentives do not favor foreclosures over modifications. Modifications, in this environment, are actually good for the servicing business, as well as good for homeowners, communities, and the property market. But servicers must do their part to build the capacity and expertise—or look outside for help.
About the Author:
Paul A. Koches is EVP, general counsel, and secretary of Ocwen Financial Corporation. Koches oversees the legal affairs of the company as well as its government, community, and media relations. Prior to joining Ocwen in 2002, Koches practiced law in Washington, D.C., for over 20 years, most recently as a partner in Arent Fox, LLP. To learn more about Ocwen Financial Corporation, please visit Ocwen.com
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38% of Sacramento County Homes Underwater- 20% Nationally
February 10th, 2010 Categories: Foreclosure News, Real Estate News
Sacramento Certified Short Sale And Pre-Foreclosure Specialist Report
Underwater Homeowners in Sacramento County
According to Real estate website Zillow.com one More than one in three Sacramento County Homes are underwater, Zillow also says one of every five U.S. home owners owed more on their mortgage than their home was worth in the fourth quarter. Nationally, The number of American single-family homes with negative equity rose to 21.4% in the fourth quarter from 21% in the third quarter, according to the Zillow Real Estate Market Reports. U.S. home values declined again in the fourth quarter, as the Zillow Home Value Index fell 5% year-over-year and down 0.5% quarter-over-quarter, to $186,200. It was the 12th consecutive quarter of year-over-year declines, the reports showed. “The prevalence of markets in or near a double-dip situation shows that we are not yet at the bottom, in terms of home values,” Stan Humphries, Zillow chief economist, said in an interview.
One in five, or 29 of the 143 markets tracked by Zillow, had at least five consecutive month-over-month increases in home values during 2009 before values began to flatten or fall again in the second part of the year. These markets included the Boston, Atlanta and San Diego metropolitan areas. Zillow said it defines a “double dip” as two periods of sustained declines in home values that are separated by a brief period of stabilization or recovery. Foreclosure resales remained high, making up 20.3% of all U.S. home sales in December. Foreclosure resales also made up the majority of sales in several metropolitan areas, including Merced, California, at 68.3%; Las Vegas, at 64 percent, and Modesto, California, at 62%. Additionally, 28.5 percent of home sales nationwide sold for less than what the seller originally paid. Home values increased year-over-year in 27 of 143 markets and remained flat in 15.
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A Clogged Foreclosure Pipeline- And over 13% of Loans are Delinquent-
January 13th, 2010 Categories: Default News, Foreclosure News, Real Estate Trends, Shortsales
Foreclosure Rates May Soar
Foreclosure Notice in Sacramento
Courtesy Chris Mcglaughlin
One in every 7.5 homeowners either fell into delinquency or foreclosure as of November 30, 2009, according to the December mortgage monitor report from Lender Processing Services. The total number of delinquencies reached a record high of 9.97%, a 5.46% increase from the previous month and a 21.29% increase from November 2008. Loans falling into more severe delinquent categories reached 5.01% through November, compared to 1.52% of loans improved toward a current status. That’s compared to November’s mortgage monitor report, when 4.02% of current mortgages through December 2008 fell into delinquency by October 2009. More than 4% of the loans that were current in December 2008, fell behind by 60 days or more, including foreclosure, by the end of November 2009.
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It’s the highest rate for that part of the year since LPS began reporting the data. The foreclosure rate in November reached 3.19%, a 1.46% increase from the previous month and an 81.41% increase from November 2008. This doesn’t include the amount of homes falling into the shadow inventory of foreclosure. Some data providers like First American CoreLogic speculate that number could be as high as 1.7 million as the roadblocks of the government incentive programs and moratoriums clog the foreclosure pipeline. “Foreclosure starts continued to decline as a result of loss mitigation efforts like the federal government’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and elevated delinquent loan volumes,” according to the report. “The reduction in foreclosure starts, combined with the steady increase in the number of seriously delinquent loans, has resulted in an ever-growing ‘shadow’ inventory of troubled properties.” The states with the most non-current loans were Florida, Nevada and Mississippi. Those with the fewest were North Dakota, South Dakota and Alaska.
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